INTRODUCTION
It is a great pleasure for me to take part in this symposium marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Michigan Journal of International Law. During these years, the journal has contributed to the development of the science of international law and, with the Michigan Law School, has played a distinct role in promoting trans-Atlantic dialogue between the United State and Europe. Judging from the participants, this symposium is another manifestation of this on-going dialogue.
The general topic on which we are called to make contributions concerns diversity and fragmentation of the international legal order. This is certainly an important and timely theme since international law is becoming ever more complex both at a normative level, with an increasing variety of specialized branches of law, and at the institutional level, with the proliferation of courts and tribunals, agencies and organizations posing the problem of overlapping competences and possible conflicts of jurisdiction. The specific topic I am proposing to address in this presentation concerns culture and the way in which its products and processes-what I call cultural heritage-have stimulated the emergence of new norms and new actors in international law. Culture represents a manifestation of diversity among the States that compose the international community. At the same time culture is also an element of diversity within the State. To the extent that culturally distinct groups exist within a State, the enjoyment of their own culture contributes to the pluralism of national societies and to the articulation of the State in a multiplicity of social actors that often seek international recognition if * Professor of International Law and Human Rights, European University Institute, Firenze, and University of Siena. not a true international legal status. Such new actors include ethnically distinct communities, minorities, indigenous peoples, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and religious groups to mention just a few examples. With the removal or at least the reduction of governmental barriers to the free flow of cultural communication and exchange between different States, the international role of these non-state actors has increased. Hence, the problem arises, as indicated in the title of this symposium, whether the emergence of these different voices onto the international plane is likely to increase diversity or cause cacophony, which is a different word for saying disharmony, discord, or even anarchy. This is a much debated subject today, and legal literature, including some contributions in this symposium, has abundantly covered the implications of the emergence of private actors, such as individuals, NGOs and transnational corporations, as participants in the law making process, tenants of rights and as potential addresses of international obligations. The role of these non-state actors has been analysed both in terms of contributions that they may bring toward a more democratic governance of human society,' but also in terms of increased risks that a culturally oriented deconstruction of the general category of citizenship may pose for the unity of the State and the orderly management of international relations.
In this paper I will try to explore the topic from a different perspective: i.e. the emergence of cultural heritage as part of the shared interest of humanity, with the consequent need for international law to safeguard it in its material and living manifestations, including the cultural communities that create, perform and maintain it. Culture in itself is not extraneous to the formation of the modern nation State. Especially in the history of nineteenth century Europe, culture as language, religion, literary and artistic traditions provided the cement and the legitimizing element to support the claim to independent statehood. In the second part of the twentieth century it provided the political foundation for the right of self-determination of peoples striving to form their independent State. This history has also influenced the language of international law where the link between individuals and the State has been identified in terms of nationality rather than citizenship. However, in the contemporary world the case of a State totally coinciding with a culturally homogeneous nation is the exception rather than the rule. Today, within most States there is co-existence of different cultures, traditions, minorities. In some States these cultural differences are filtered and distilled into a higher idea of a common polity, attracting a superior allegiance from the people. In others, diversity is maintained through a constitutional equilibrium of power-sharing (as in Switzerland) or through the integration of diversity into a true multicultural society founded on constitutional guarantees of fundamental freedoms and human rights (as in the United States). In other cases, culture can become the source of intolerance, claims for separation, and sometimes for violent oppression and ethnic conflict.
International law has not remained indifferent to this dynamic of culture within the State and between the States. Protection of minorities, as addressed in post World War I peace treaties and ad hoc treaties, has helped deconstruct the sovereign State by legitimizing the claim to an international status of culturally distinct groups. 2 Universal human rights law has confirmed this status with Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 and has provided the foundation for the gradual building up of a movement toward the recognition of a distinct and enhanced status of indigenous peoples. 4 At the same time, international law has played a constructive role in furnishing the intellectual basis to models of supranational integration (as in Europe) which build upon a common core of traditions, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and economic freedoms. From this common core of cultural values a proto-federal structure transcending the nation State and a new transnational constitution' is currently developing.
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See 1211 Summer 2004] Given this very broad and complex background, an examination of the manifold manifestations in which culture creates an international entitlement for human groups (non-state actors) would occupy much more space and time than what I am allowed. So, I will concentrate my analysis on the more technical aspects of the way in which international law has articulated the relevance of cultural heritage in normative terms. I will identify three separate facets of such articulation: 1) the protection of cultural heritage and cultural groups as part of the protection of human rights; 2) the emergence of the concept of individual criminal responsibility for cultural crimes; 3) the emerging notion of "cultural diversity" as a general interest for whose protection the international community "as a whole" must mobilize.
I. CULTURAL HERITAGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The UN Charter does not contain specific clauses connecting culture to human rights. In 1948 the UN General Assembly rejected the notion of "cultural genocide." 6 Yet, the development of international law since then provides evidence that the protection of human rights, now part of positive international law, extends to culture and cultural heritage of peoples.
First, the concept of human dignity, which informs the human rights provisions of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration (". . . recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family . .. ") ' includes peoples entitlement to the respect of the cultural heritage that forms an integral part of their identity, history and civilization. Destruction or desecration of symbolic objects and sites that are essential to the enactment of a people's culture (be it a library, a place of worship, a sacred site for indigenous peoples) is a violation of their collective dignity no less than a violation of their personal dignity.
Second, Article 22 of the Universal Declaration states that everyone . is entitled to realization.., of... cultural rights indispensable for his dignity." 8 Article 18 guarantees the right to freedom of conscience and religion which is an integral part of one's culture. 9 Article 27 pro- States' 5 and de facto applied by many non-parties as expression of general principles of international law, 6 recognizes that "... damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world."' 7 In peacetime, the 1972 World Heritage Convention, whose parties are now numbering 172, confirms the same principle with respect to cultural and natural heritage as an outstanding universal value and requires that the "State Parties to this Convention recognize that such heritage constitutes a world heritage for whose protection it is the duty of the international community as a whole to co-operate.' 8 Fourth, the relevance of this treaty practice for the present discussion is further proven by the fact that cultural rights of individuals, groups and of humanity as a whole are guaranteed not only in inter-state relations, as in the case of international conflicts, but also in relation to purely domestic situations where the issue of the protection of cultural heritage arises within the territory of the State. The destruction in 2001 of the great Buddhas of Bamyian, as part of the Taliban's delirium of cultural cleansing, attracted protests and condemnation by States, including Islamic States, the UN, UNESCO, the EU, and other international organizations. '9 The mobilization of shame against such act has led to the adoption by the UNESCO General Conference in October, 2003 of the Declaration on Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, which is intended to prevent the repetition of such acts in the future.°1
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The updated list of State parties is available at http://erc.unesco.org/cp/ convention.asp?KO= 13637&language=E.
16. The United States, whose ratification has been pending in the Senate for the past ten years, has applied the Hague principles in its military manuals. The Operational Law Handbook treats the Hague rules as norms of customary law and the international section of the legal office of the department of defence systematically trains military personnel on the respect for cultural property, on the prohibition of their use for hostile purposes, on the interpretation of military necessity and prior warning in case of unavoidable use of force.
17. Hague Convention, supra note 14, at pmbl. 
II. CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
While it is clear that today the violation of international standards on the protection of cultural heritage of any people may attract State responsibility, 2 ' it is especially with regard to individual criminal responsibility that one can find the most significant developments in contemporary practice. At the time of this writing, Prosecutor v. Strugar 2 is pending before the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). This legal action is based on an indictment that charged the defendant with violations of the laws and customs of war and in particular with "unjustified devastation, unlawful attacks on civilian objects, destruction or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science. 2 3 This case is especially interesting because it concerns the bombing of the old city of Dubrovnik, a site inscribed in the UNESCO World Heritage List, which makes it of indisputable universal relevance for humanity as a whole. Strugar, in his capacity as commander of the Yugoslavian army, was responsible for the bombing of the city of Dubrovnik. He was indicted for intentional destruction of cultural property of great interest for humanity as a whole.
In March, 2004, the ICTY enacted its judgment on another case regarding the shelling of the old town of Dubrovnik perpetrated in 1991, holding that "the crime of destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education, and the arts and sciences, and to historic monuments and works of art and science ... destruction may constitute an international wrongful act just because of the general interest of the international community in preventing such discriminatory and arbitrary destruction.
21. The principle of State responsibility for intentional destruction of cultural heritage of importance to humanity is included in paragraph VI of the UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, supra note 20, which reads: "[a] State that intentionally destroys or intentionally fails to take appropriate measures to prohibit, prevent, stop, and punish any intentional destruction of cultural heritage of great importance for humanity, whether or not it is inscribed on a list maintained by UNESCO or another international organization, bears the responsibility for such destruction, to the extent provided for by international law." International responsibility for violations of the rules on the protection of cultural heritage has also been spelled out in Article 38 of the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event Of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/hague/html]eng/protocol2.shtml (hereinafter Second Protocol) which includes "the duty to provide reparation." Article 31 of the Second Protocol provides also that the Parties undertake to act, jointly through the Committee (the treaty body established to oversee the implementation of the Protocol), or individually, in cooperation with UNESCO and the United Nations, and in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 1954 Hague Convention.° This protocol was negotiated and adopted in order to reinforce the rather weak system of the Hague Convention in the face of the devastation brought upon cultural heritage in the conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s, especially the Iraq-Iran war and the Balkan conflict. 3 ' This protocol applies in its entirety to international and noninternational armed conflicts and it is entering into force just at the time of this symposium. 32 Chapter 4 of the Protocol introduces the principle of universal jurisdiction over the most "serious violations" of the norms protecting cultural heritage. 3 3 Article 17 obliges the party in whose territory the offender is present to prosecute or extradite that person regardless of his or her nationality or of the place where the offence was committed.
The link between the international protection of cultural heritage and individual criminal responsibility has not remained confined to its mere enunciation in conventional and statutory provisions in international instruments. It has been increasingly articulated and fleshed out in the case law of international courts and tribunals, especially of the ICTY. Besides the case of Prosecutor v. Joki6, 3 4 where cultural crimes have been recognized as independent counts of criminal liability under the laws and customs of war, several precedents can be identified which elaborate a typology of connections between cultural heritage and individual criminal responsibility. Thus, the act of destruction of cultural property with discriminatory intent toward a culturally distinct group, besides being capable of autonomously falling under the rubric of war crimes, has been considered to be an element of crimes against humanity, specifically of the crime of persecution within the meaning of ... when perpetrated with the requisite discriminatory intent, [the destruction] amounts to an attack on the very religious identity of the people. As such it manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion of 'crimes against humanity' for all of humanity is indeed injured by the destruction of a unique religious culture and its concomitant cultural objects. 35 This decision is notable also for its recognition that acts of destruction or wilful damage to cultural property dedicated to religion has been "... criminalized under customary international law. ' 36 In an earlier decision, in the Blaskic case, 37 the threshold of persecution set by the Tribunal in relation to acts of wilful destruction of cultural heritage was set quite high: the acts must be re-iterated or systematic and must reveal a pattern of gross violations. Thus not every single act of destruction of cultural heritage, even of wanton destruction, amounts to the crime of persecution.
Another important aspect of the intersection between cultural heritage and individual criminal responsibility is the finding by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY that deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of a given ethnic group may constitute evidence of the element of mens rea required for the commission of the crime of genocide. 38 This places new emphasis on the social existence of a group, as opposed to its purely biological existence, with the consequences that the systematic destruction of symbolic places and buildings of their culture and religion may reveal, under appropriate circumstances, the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part such group within the meaning of genocide under 
Beyond State Sovereignty
Of course, the limit of this jurisprudence, and of the international norms thereby applied, is that it concerns situations of armed conflict where protection of cultural heritage is somehow becoming part and parcel of humanitarian law and the international protection is a consequence of the fundamental distinction between military and non-military objectives. However, at least with regard to gross violations of the international obligation to respect cultural heritage-such as the intentional destruction of monuments of universal importance-it seems that an opinio juris as to their unlawful character also in peace time is emerging. This is witnessed by the world-wide condemnation of the acts of destruction by the Taliban of the great Buddha of Bamyam in 2001.40 It is confirmed by the resolve manifested within the UN and UNESCO to clarify that international law does not tolerate such acts of barbarity, a resolve that has led to the unanimous adoption in 2003 of the UNESCO Declaration Concerning Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage. This declaration is an instrument of soft law.' It is not a binding treaty. Yet, the fact that it represents the legal follow-up to a specific act of cultural devastation, together with the nature of the declaration as the product of the will of the international community as a whole-because the whole world is represented in the UNESCO General Conference-2 makes such instrument a particularly relevant indicator of the sense of obligation that wilful destruction of cultural heritage, whether in armed conflict or in peacetime, may entail State responsibility and individual criminal liability. 43 In addition to the practice developed in the ICTY and UNESCO, the linkage between protection of cultural heritage and international responsibility for violations of fundamental rights of individuals and groups has influenced the case law of specific human rights courts. In a 1999 decision in the case of Islamic Community of Bosnia v. Rep. Srpska, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia referred to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights to support its conclusion that freedom of religion in
40.
See supra text accompanying note 21. 
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The universal character of the General Conference at the time of the adoption of this Declaration is all the more evident by the re-joining of the United States to the Organization. Today, the only country that appears to be absent from UNESCO is Singapore.
43.
See supra note 19, at paras. VI, VII.
Summer 2004] a given community cannot be achieved unless peaceful enjoyment of the places and buildings dedicated to worship is guaranteed to the people."4
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY
The developments analyzed in the preceding sections show that, under appropriate circumstances, cultural heritage in the territory of any State may be considered an element of the general interest of the international community, and, as such, it must be protected even against the wishes of the territorial State. This new form of protection entails that, today, States are bound to tolerate scrutiny and intervention, especially by competent international organizations, when they wilfully engage in, or intentionally fail to prevent, the destruction of, or serious damage to, cultural heritage of significant value for humanity. While this conclusion leaves open the question of what is the threshold of the "value" of the item of cultural heritage in order for it to reach the level of common concern for humanity, it is clear that the increasing number of lists, registers and inventories established and maintained by competent international organizations, notably UNESCO, 4 5 are capable of providing objective parameters of evaluation and a prima facie certification of the international significance of a given item of cultural heritage. In this sense, culture as the common patrimony of humankind becomes an important tool to counterbalance sovereignty, understood as the complete and undisturbed dominion over a territorial space, and to foreclose the objection of "domestic jurisdiction" so often invoked to preserve the power monopoly of the sovereign State. 46 
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See But the impact of the international concern with cultural heritage goes beyond the territorial dimension of sovereignty. As we have shown in the preceding sections, cultural heritage is linked to the human element. It represents the symbolic continuity of a society beyond its contingent biological existence. Thus, the obligation to respect cultural heritage is closely linked with the obligation to respect human rights and to sanction its most serious breaches with individual criminal liability under international law.
The recognition of this human dimension of cultural heritage raises the problem whether international law should shift from a protection of cultural heritage as the purely material products of the creativity of a given people or group to the more ambitious goal of safeguarding the very social structures and processes that permit the generation and transmission of such products. This brings us to the subject of cultural diversity as a value to be safeguarded in itself and beyond the value of the single cultural object.
As is known, contemporary international law has already recognized "biological diversity" as the common concern of humankind. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 47 transcends the traditional approach based on conservation of individual species and recognizes the interconnected nature of the different components of the global ecosystem. Hence, the convention recognizes that it is the interest of humanity to preserve biological diversity as a value in itself, beyond the value of the single species to be protected.
Should a similar development take place also with respect to cultural diversity? In addressing this question, certainly one cannot ignore that there is a difference between culture and nature. Biological diversity, which finds expression in the infinite variety of forms of life in the biosphere, is more permanent and resilient; it is subject only to the slow pace of mutation according to the laws of evolution, save for the destructive impact of human activities. Culture, by contrast is more adaptable. It is subject to constant exchange and its evolution may be measured within the span of generations rather than millennia.
While these differences are real, there is no plausible reason for holding that the more dynamic and adaptable character of culture should be an obstacle to the legal recognition of the value of cultural diversity and of the need to safeguard such diversity as a general interest of humanity.
On the contrary, the evolutionary character of culture requires the maintenance of robust cultural traditions whose richness and diversity
47.
See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, available at http:// www.biodiv.org/convention/larticles.asp. 1221 Summer 2004] permit fruitful exchange and interaction between different peoples and world views. International law cannot remain indifferent to this task. First, because the present state of economic globalization is generating an increasing concern with the prospect of a uniform commercial monoculture and with the destabilizing effects that this may entail in terms of loss of social cohesion and identity in national societies. Second, because only international law, rather than individual sovereign States, may perform the pedagogical role needed to bridge the gap of diffidence and hostility between different civilizations and world views that globalization has unleashed and that we urgently need to re-compose today in the complex puzzle of shared humanity. How badly we need international law in pursuing this goal is proven, unfortunately, by the current increase in violent conflict and terrorism as a consequence of the attempt to unilaterally transplant, by force, democracy and free market in countries where different social structures and complex cultural traditions prevail. 41 Thus, if international law has a role to play in the safeguarding of cultural diversity, 9 how has this role been performed and what results have been achieved so far? I shall try to respond to this question by examining two important developments that are currently contributing to the emergence in international law of a common concern for the safeguarding of cultural diversity. I refer to the recent movement toward the adoption of an international regime for the protection of the immaterial elements of living cultures, what we call intangible cultural heritage, and the present effort toward the adoption of a universal treaty on cultural diversity.
A. Intangible Cultural Heritage
The concept of "intangible cultural heritage" covers an infinite variety of manifestations of a living culture as opposed to the material products-movable or immovable-that have been the object of international protection in the past. typical forms of musical expression: literary and oral traditions; poetry, languages, theatre, dance and mime; religious traditions and rituals; crafts and skills; choreography and costumes; agricultural practices; indigenous medicinal practices linked with knowledge of plants; social methods of dispute settlement and other forms of traditional creativity that anthropologists generally catalogue as "folklife." So many forms of immaterial cultural heritage have one feature in common; all of them provide elements to define the identity of a cultural community with its specific social and intellectual processes and distinct world view. This specificity characterizes the relevant cultural community in relation to the broader framework of the sovereign State; its speciality or uniqueness becomes an appealing symbol of community identity.
An early recognition of the international relevance of these living aspects of culture was the UNESCO Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore.
5 ' This recommendation was adopted by the General Conference in 1989 after several years of difficult deliberations mainly due to the dilemma whether to protect traditional culture by way of intellectual property rights or through a separate normative instrument. The 1989 Recommendation shunned this dilemma by limiting its role to the enunciation of a set of general principles and guidelines of a non-binding character. 2 In the period immediately following the adoption of the UNESCO Recommendation little progress was made toward effective protection of intangible cultural heritage. The implementation of the UNESCO Recommendation in domestic law was generally inadequate. Many countries continued to have no laws, administrative measures or customary rules to specially safeguard intangible cultural heritage. Identification and cataloguing of traditional culture remained lacking thus preventing the very visibility of such culture for the purpose of its legal protection. In response to these shortcomings, in the mid 1990's a new interest and a new approach began to emerge. In 1994, UNESCO adopted the Guidelines on Living Human Treasures, 3 which, following the example set in Asia by countries such as Japan and Korea, aimed at developing incentives and legislation to support the survival of old craft skills which, although not capable of generating sufficient income in a market economy, are Folklore: Local Empowerment and International Cooperation. The conclusions of the Washington conference contained substantive recommendations and an operational resolution. The recommendations reiterated the necessity of adopting a more inclusive definition of intangible cultural heritage, going beyond the concepts of folklore and of popular culture used in the 1989 UNESCO Recommendation. More important, it highlighted the need to put at the center of the system of protection the peoples, groups and communities that are the creators and bearers of intangible cultural heritage. This represented an important shift as compared to the approach adopted in the past of giving overriding priority to the interest of scientific research thus relegating cultural communities to mere objects of study and investigation. The operational resolution consisted in a request to UNESCO to undertake a feasibility 57 This convention defines intangible cultural heritage as "the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills-as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith-that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage." 8 The rationale of the convention lies in the idea that the protection of intangible cultural heritage has not only the purpose of safeguarding national interests belonging to each sovereign State, but, particularly, the value of such heritage "as a mainspring of cultural diversity," '59 corresponding to a "common concern" of the international community as a whole. 6 0 In this sense, the close interrelation between cultural diversity and intangible heritage is stressed by the second part of the definition, according to which "[such] heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. ' 5 The Committee has the competence, inter alia, of selecting the items of intangible heritage to be safeguarded at the international level according to Chapter IV of the convention. This circumstance is capable of weakening the role played by the peoples concerned in the operation of the convention and, a fortiori, its proper functioning and effectiveness, since only such peoples own the appropriate knowledge, skills and ability for properly managing and safeguarding the intangible heritage they have created and transmitted from generation to generation.
B. Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions
While the concept of intangible cultural heritage operates directly within the sphere of national sovereignty in that it entails empowering non-state actors, i.e. peoples and local communities, with a claim to legal protection under international law, the concept of cultural diversity takes this process a step further and introduces the concept of "humanity" as the new "non-state actor" entitled to the safeguarding of cultural diversity as a common patrimony to be preserved in the public interest to be transmitted to future generations. Although no binding treaty has been adopted yet to directly protect and promote cultural diversity, several soft law instruments have already occupied the field and a new convention is now being negotiated within the framework of UNESCO.
The first instrument to be mentioned is the 1966 UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, 66 whose Article 1 proclaims that "in their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influences they exert on one another, all cultures form part of the common heritage belonging to all mankind." The 1992 UN General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 67 Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities reiterated at Articles 1 and 4 that pluralism and cultural diversity form part of the general interest of humanity. Finally, in 2001, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 6 8 whose Article 1 expressly states that "as a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature: in this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of the present and future gen-
65.
See id. at art. 5. Beyond State Sovereignty erations." On the basis of this statement, the declaration stresses the inseparability of the defense of cultural diversity from human rights, both in the sense that the former implies a commitment to the fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular of minorities and indigenous peoples, and in the sense that cultural diversity may not be invoked as an excuse to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law. 69 Further, the declaration proclaims cultural heritage as the "wellspring of creativity" because "creation draws on the roots of cultural tradition, but flourishes in contact with other cultures. For this reason, heritage in all its forms must be preserved, enhanced and handed on to future generations as a record of human experience and aspirations, so as to foster creativity in all its diversity." 7° This entails that cultural products and services should be treated not as mere commodities but as "vectors of identity, values and meaning" and that in the present context of globalization the free flow of ideas and works should be made compatible with "... the production and dissemination of diversified cultural goods and services through cultural industries that have the means to assert themselves at the local and global level.
' 7 '
As often happens in international law, the adoption of a soft law instrument is only the first step toward the establishment of a binding legal regime. This has happened also with the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. In October, 2003, the UNESCO General Conference, on the basis of a comprehensive preliminary study on the technical and legal aspects relating to the desirability of a standard setting-instrument on cultural diversity, approved a resolution deciding that the question of cultural diversity "must be regulated by an international convention." It was mandating that the UNESCO Director-General submit to the 33rd Session of the General Conference (Fall, 2005) a report on the negotiating progress and a first draft of a Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions. 2 The protection of cultural diversity as the common heritage of humanity is now on the international agenda. The negotiations currently taking place 73 are not likely to produce a quick result. Opposition still remains from certain powerful States based on the fear that the future Convention may allow States to raise barriers to the free circulation of cultural products and services. 74 A difficult challenge lies ahead in terms of tuning the UNESCO work with the existing commitment of its members with the WTO and the TRIPS agreements.
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' But in spite of these uncertainties, for the purpose of our discussion, the work of UNESCO and the international practice developing in connection with it has made abundantly clear that the international community has recognized cultural diversity as the common heritage of humanity. By doing so, it has removed cultural heritage from the exclusive control of national sovereignty; it has empowered the non-state actors represented by the peoples and communities who are the bearers of such heritage to claim international protection, if necessary, even against their national State or against third parties. Ultimately, it has made humanity as such the title holder of the general interest to the protection and transmission of cultural diversity as the common and indivisible patrimony of human civilization.
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